Pagina 24 - BCSV, XXXV, 2005

24 LEON POMPA
The value of Locke’s account of ideas is that it firmly links them with
thè concept of understanding but, unfortunately, it does so in an incor-
rect way30. There are two well-known objections to this conception of an
idea as some sort of mental object. The first is that in connecting thè
meaning of words with something present in thè mind, there is no guar-
antee that thè same words will be connected to thè same mental contents
in thè minds of different people. Locke’s failure to notice this cruciai de-
fect is probably due to thè fact that, given his commitment to a causai
view of thè mind-body relationship, he could not see how anything oth-
er than accurate representations of thè constituents of perception could
be caused to arise in thè mind, at least with regard to thè basic con­
stituents that he calls ‘simple ideas’. The second difficulty in his theory
comes to light if we turn to book IV, which contains his most detailed
discussion of thè meaning of words. Recognising that almost all words
are generai in meaning, he then has to explain how this generality can be
made compatible with thè explanation that their meaning consists in
their beingparticular mental objects. In a notorious passage, in which he
discusses howwe move from a grasp of particular ideas to a grasp of thè
generality of their meaning, he asks, for example, «does it not require
some pains and skill to form thè generai Idea of a Triangle (which is yet
none of thè most abstract, comprehensive and difficult) for it must be
neither Oblique, not Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrucial nor
Scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect it is something im-
perfect, that cannot exist; an Idea wherein some parts of several differ­
ent and inconsistent Ideas are put together»31. This is thè passage upon
which Berkeley seized when, in his wish to show that we could have no
idea of substance as a substrate as it appeared in Locke’s philosophy, he
attacked thè suggestion that thè generality of ideas could be explained
in terms of images that were generai in virtue of being abstract52.
In giving an account of thè necessary relation between ideas and lan­
guage, in which there can neither be language without ideas nor ideas
50 At I, I, 8, as noted, he says of thè word ‘idea’ that it is «that term which serves best to
stand for whatever is thè object of thè understanding when a man thinks».
51 An Essay C.oncerning Human Understanding, IV, VII, 9.
52A Treatise Concerning thè Principies of Human Knowledge, Introduction, § XIII: «For
example, does it not require some pains and skill to form thè generai idea of a triangle? (which
is yet none of thè most abstract, comprehensive and difficult); for it must be neither oblique,
nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, not scalenon, but all and none of these at once.
In effect it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several dif­
ferent and inconsistent ideas are put together». Berkeley’s criticism is valid only against thè
imagistic aspect of Locke’s account of a generai idea.