Pagina 39 - BCSV, XXXV, 2005

TITE IMAGINATIVE UNIVERSAL 39
characteristics, as would seem to be necessary in such a case71. The prob-
lem could, of course, easily be overcome if it were permissible, as would
be possible in thè case of later non-original figurative languages, such as
the language of blazonry, to designate some aspect of the gesture as sig-
nifying negation. But designation cannot be presupposed by a language
of naturai relations, which will need to explain how designation itself can
arise and do so, ex hypothesi, on the basis of some naturai correlate. There
is thus an additional problem as to how it is possible to operate the idea
of negation in an originai language of images and gestures72.
But, setting this complication to one side, it seems clear at least that
truth and falsity are mutually implicated. It is thus impossible for any so­
ciety, no matter how primitive, to have an idea of truth, i.e. of what it is
for something, for example a belief or an assertion, to be true, without
also having an idea of falsity. It is a case of both or neither. But if it is
both, then, as we have seen, the language cannot operate solely on the
basis of ‘naturai relations’ between language and ideas, while, if it is nei­
ther, such a society cannot have any beliefs at all. And in this case, of
course, we would seem to have left thè realms of any recognisably hu­
man society. It might seem that this does not imply that Vico cannot, us-
ing his normal conceptual language, assert, from his own later point of
view, that all their beliefs were true or false, but this would be a mistake,
for, since poetic man could not have known what it was for anything, be
it a statement or belief, to be true or false, he could not have had beliefs
proper at ali, as attributed to him.
What I have argued here applies however, mutatis mutandis, to the
other modalities mentioned above. It could be said that not ali of these
are necessary for a very primitive language. But, though that may well be
true, it is not really to the point. What is important in this context is that
the practices of commanding, obeying, wondering, worshipping, sen-
tencing, accusing and so on, come into Vico’s description of thè social,
legai and religious activities of poetic man. So they are necessary for this
71 Admittedly, this is a very crude suggestion as to what might be needed. Stili, the content
of thè naturai correlate to negation needs to be specified. It cannot consist in the sheer absence
of some item. Otherwise, there would be no way of bringing out the difference between the
meaning of ‘there is no elephant in the room’ and ‘there is no mouse in the room’. But the idea
that there might be some correlate in the world, something which could be indicated, to serve
as a basis of the idea of negation has largely been rejected in favour of theories in which nega­
tion is analysed at the purely linguistic level. This, plainly, would not be a possible mode of ex­
planation with regard to an originai language based on naturai relations with ideas.
72 For a discussion of the problem, see S. WORTH, Pictures Can’t Say 'Ain’t', in «Versus.
Quaderni di studi semiotici» XII (1975).