Pagina 44 - BCSV, XXXV, 2005

44 LEON POMPA
I shall turn to Verene’s answer to this question shortly. But there are
two points to be noted here. First, despite thè difference in these two
passages as to whether thè poetic character is based upon a resemblance
between certain things or, on thè other hand, an identity underlying
them, in both cases Vico continuali)' refers to a relation between indi­
viduai, species and generi, or kinds. He continues, that is to say, to use
traditional Aristotelian language, at least, in which individuai fall with-
in species and species within kinds, when describing thè creation and
meaning of poetic characters. On thè face of it, then, it stili looks as
though, despite his insistence upon poetic man’s inability to frame thè
abstract or intelligible universal, Vico’s account of thè formation of po­
etic characters stili presupposes an ability at least to recognise and dis­
tinguili individuai, and instances of species and kinds, even if poetic
man is unable to grasp thè conceptual difference between species and
kinds.
This point has tended to be rejected on thè grounds that thè world
of poetic man is encountered not «as a world of clear-cut objects and
persons, but instead as a world of forces and emotional qualities»85. But
this reply is unsatisfactory since, although it is true that thè world of po­
etic man is a world infused with forces and emotions, these forces and
emotions would stili need to be identified in some sort of a structured
way, i.e. as instances of kinds, before they can become part of a recog-
nisable world. A world in which it is impossible to distinguish consis­
ten ti between a force and an emotion, such as, for example, between a
storm and anger, or, again, between different feelings, such as anger and
thirst, would not be a recognisable world at all. It would, indeed, be a
world so chaotic as to preclude thè continuation of any sort of existence
at all, even of thè sort lived by thè giants. For, to return to Croce’s re-
mark, early man was a creature of flesh and bone and not some philo-
sophical abstraction. Hence, as mentioned earlier, he must at least be al-
lowed thè abilities necessary to acquire thè things needed to satisfy thè
biological and physical needs of his life and those of his women and their
progeny. But if this is so, and thè creation of poetic characters presup­
poses thè existence of creatures with thè power to identify instances of
kinds of things or forces in thè world, imaginative universals could not
constitute a primary non-conceptual mode of mental functioning. They
would not constitute a different mode of thought but, at best, a differ-
85 ibid., p. 74, and G. CANTELLI, Gestualità e mito, cit., p. 89. The evidence for this view
lies in Vico’s claim that «men first feel without perceiving, then they perceive with a troubled
and agitated spirit, finally they reflect with a clear mind» (Sn44, § 218).