Pagina 47 - BCSV, XXXV, 2005

TI IEIMAGINATIVE UNIVERSAL 47
be identified as literally being Ulysses in a sense analogous to thè asser-
tion a rational mind would make in maintaining each to have thè quali-
ty of being ‘prudent’»96. Verene puts thè point in various other ways: «thè
individuai is what it is because its being is thè being of thè type». Again,
«thè individuai cannot be thought of as having a reality apart from thè
generic character; he is what he is only through his identity with it»97.
It is noticeable, however, that, with thè exception of thè first formu-
lation, where thè concept of a class is invoked, Verene is unable to char-
acterise thè being of Ulysses without reference to thè notion of a type or
a generic character. On this view, then, Vico’s ‘identity of predication’
means not just identifying an individuai with some generic character but
identifying thè being or reality of thè individuai with thè reality of thè
type. But what is thè generic character involved here? It is easy enough
to understand this in ordinary Aristotelian terms. It would just be thè
character exhibited by all members of thè class, for example, by all chiefs
of war. So somebody would be a true chief of war if he exhibited a cer­
tain characteristic shared by all other such chiefs. But this implies a dis-
tinction between thè members of thè genus and thè common character­
istic as a result of which they are members of thè genus. Plainly, howev­
er, that is not what is being suggested here. Somehow, true chiefs of war
are what they are in virtue of being identical with an ideal portrait that
constitutes thè reality of thè type. This cannot mean, of course, that thè
existence of individuai as individuai depends upon this identification.
That would make no sense at all, since their existence as particular indi­
viduai, rather than as chiefs of war, would then be dependent upon
whether or not this identification held98. But, plainly, individuai can ex-
ist without being chiefs of war. It is their being as chiefs ofwar that is in
question. On thè other hand, if it meant only that there is an ideal por­
trait which provides thè measure of what it is to be a true war chief, this
would not be puzzling, since it would amount to little more than sug-
gesting that there is a standard to be met before someone can truly be
described as a chief of war. But that cannot, in any case, be thè idea, since
we would stili be left with a distinction between thè individuai who
could approximate to this ideal standard in varying degrees and thè char-
96 V eren e , op. cit., p. 77.
97 Ibid., p. 75.
98 In one of thè above formulations Verene seems to suggest that this is what he means:
«thè individuai cannot be thought of as having a reality apart from thè generic character; he
is what he is only through his identity with it» (ivi). But I cannot believe that that is what he
means. Since no individuai can be reai unless he has a number of characteristics, I take it that
Verene is making a claim about thè being of thè individuai as, in this case, a chief of war.