Pagina 56 - BCSV, XXXV, 2005

56 LEON POMPA
example, can be taken to be imitations, but they are not imitations sim­
ply because of thè movements involved. What is required is a certain
kind of context, one in which there is a convention that in certain situa-
tions certain movements should be to be taken as imitations. This means
that in taking gestures to be imitations, thè idea of imitation is presup-
posed114. But there seems to be no way in which such an idea could be
expressed in, or grasped by means of, a naturai poetic language. Plain­
ly, on pain of circularity, no gesture can express thè idea of imitation, if
this means that it is a naturai imitation of an imitation. This applies also
to paintings and sculptures. We take thè fact that many of these are rep-
resentations so much for granted that it is easy enough to think that thè
representational nature of such objects is self-evident. But again, as many
modem artists have shown, something which, situated in a gallery, will
be taken to be a representation will not be taken in this way in ordinary
life outside thè gallery.
also functions as an image of, only in virtue of some mode of construal» (A. MACINTYRE, Imag-
inative Universals and Historical Falsification: A Rejoiner to Professor Verene, in «New Vico
Studies» VI, 1988, p. 28).
114 TRABANT, op. cit., pp. 41-42, takes an entirely different view in order to overcome thè
problem crcated by thè naturalness of thè first signs. «The extreme naturalness of thè first
signs», he writes, «which are actual physical objects, makes it necessary that they be de-sig-
nated - declared to be signs - so that semiosis can proceed by an inner indexicality. Creating
signifiers does not yet involve thè fashioning of material semiotic entities whose semioticity is
self-evident, but in ‘mutely pointing’ at or displaying already existing physical objects [...].
Pointing at a frog does not mean ‘this is a frog’, but rather raises thè frog to thè status of a
sign: ‘thè frog that I ani pointing at signifies thè idea that I am a son of thè earth’ [...]. Point­
ing at is thè means by which a frog is elevated from its status as an object and living thing [...]
to semiotic status». But he gives a different explanation of thè semioticity of bodily move­
ments. «If my actions are non-routine and consequently suggest that they must be interpret-
ed as a signifier, they already have this indexical aspect. Gestures intended as signs cannot be
part of any genuine activity. In other words, swinging a scythe is an ill-chosen signifier if I am
standing in a wheat field during harvest. If I swing a scythe it must instead be an imitative ges­
ture (thè purpose of which is manifesti)' not linked to a reai harvest) that signifies thè idea
‘three harvests’ and thus ‘three years’». But it is extremely difficult to see how thè act of point­
ing at a frog can raise thè frog to thè status of a signifier, particularly one with thè significance
that Vico attaches to a frog in this example. How, given thè multitude of possibilities avail-
able, could anyone who did not already understand thè meaning (i.e., idea) of ‘I am a son of
thè earth' possibly know that this, rather than any other of these many possibilities, is what
pointing at a frog means? But to know thè meaning of ‘I am a son of thè earth’ he must al­
ready be able to signify things. Hence this explanation presupposes thè point at issue. The
same consideration applies to thè example of thè three harvests standing for three years. The
making of a scything movement in non-standard conditions may well be taken as an imitation
of scything, but, if thè points made above are correct, this will not mean that, merely in virtue
of thè movement, theywill be taken to be signifiers, either of harvests or, through this, of years.
The notion that they are at least potential signifiers must already be present before this ex­
planation can work. But then thè concept of signification will again be presupposed.