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LEON POMPA
a language of naturai connections, we must conclude that Croce was cor-
rect in his criticism of thè imaginative universal and, indeed, that Vico’s
theory of a naturai poetic language, exemplified in thè language of thè
imaginative universal, fails to satisfy thè conditions necessary for any lan
guage.
11.
It remains to be asked what, if this criticai assessment of Vico’s
account of thè nature of poetic life and language is correct, can be done,
or needs to be done, if any of Vico’s achievements in these areas are to
be preserved? This, again, is an undertaking which, if it were to be done
properly, would take me well beyond thè scope of this essay. However,
it is important to make some generai points, in order that thè foregoing
criticisms are not extended beyond their proper limits.
First, it would seem that Croce was correct when he accused Vico of
over-estimating what thè imagination can do, while neglecting too many
capacities necessary for remaining in touch with thè reai, as distinet from
thè imagined, world and, hence, for thè maintenance of life. As I have
tried to argue, almost thè whole of Vico’s description of thè divine world
presupposes a set of abilities and powers of discrimination that are con
ceptual in character, even when they are not developed in any explicit
form of language. Vico did not fail to recognise these capacities through
his use of thè faculty of ingenium, «thè faculty that connects disparate
and diverse things», as modified in its connection with thè sensory top-
ics but he failed to realise that a language based upon thè recognition of
resemblances and differences in features of thè reai world would be con
ceptual in character and that its existence would negate thè need for a
pre-conceptual poetic language as a condition of thè linguistic commu-
nication of information necessary for thè satisfaction of thè needs in
volved in any early form of society.
Second, thè criticism of Vico’s account of thè poetic origins of language
and ideas, has implications only for his account of how poetic man thought
and expressed his thought. It does not imply that he was wrong in thinking
that language must arise naturally. His mistake was to fail to realise that
language necessarily requires conventions and that what he needed to do
was to explain how a language involving conventions could arise natural
ly rather than how a language without conventions could arise117.
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It is possible that Vico thought that a language involving conventions must arise
through conscious agreement and would therefore give rise to a regress, in which every such
language would require a prior language based upon conventions for thè agreement required
to create it. But it would not be impossible to explain how, granted thè faculty of ingenium,