Pagina 25 - BCSV, XLI, 2

REFLECTIONS ON THE IDEAL ETERNAL HISTORY 25
must be rejected, as a false empirical hypothesis about the origins of
human society. It may well be that he was in good company here since
his three princes of natural justice were in agreement with him that
there had been an original state of human nature, but this only means
that they, along with Lucretius, a prime influence, were equally mistak-
en in thinking that there had ever been such an original state of socie-
ty. It follows that insofar as Vico’s account of that state was predicated
as the first phase of his metaphysics of the human mind, starting from
a crude and barbaric nature which progressively develops into man’s
true and proper nature, «modest, benign and reasonable» which recog-
nises «conscience, reason and duty as laws» 28 the whole historic
sequence based on this, must also be rejected. And so, in turn, must the
ideal eternal history, understood as a metaphysical pattern underlying
and determining the outline and shape of human history. Hence, in
effect, Vico’s attempt to present empirical history sub specie aeternitatis
must be seen as a heroic but misguided vision.
More happily, however, not all of the key conceptions in the Scienza
nuova need be rejected as a consequence of these errors. The first point
to be observed is that Vico’s underlying reason for introducing a con-
straint to give a shape to human history remains an invaluable insight.
We can see this if we turn to the famous formulation in which he gives
his reason for introducing the need for his metaphysics of the human
mind. Here we must note the remarks that precede and explain his pro-
cedure. These are given in the first paragraph of Section Three of Book
One, entitled Principles. Having set out the One Hundred and
Fourteen Elements, which he takes to be basic to his entire Science,
Vico then challenges the reader to compare his theses to the writings of
the philologians and philosophers and, confident that his will be found
to be both more comprehensive and consistent, he concludes: «So for
the purposes of this inquiry, we must reckon as if there were no books
in the world»29.
In effect, therefore, he has renounced any appeal to the learning of
his day, other than that to be found in Plato and Tacitus. But this cer-
tainly does not mean that he intends to disregard all the empirical evi-
dence of the day. Rather what he means is the he is going to take noth-
ing on trust, without submitting it to a severe metaphysical analysis. In
28 Sn44, 918.
29 Ivi, 330.